Introduction

Unification of the East and West German economies in July 1990 -the Economic, Monetary
and Social Union -came as a shock to the formerly centrally planned East German economy.
The almost immediate imposition of the West German type of market economy with all its distinctive institutional features and its relative prices led to dramatic imbalances in particular in the East German labor markets. For example the official unemployment rate rose from about 2% in the GDR to more than 15% in 1992. It remained on that level for the following years. To avoid higher unemployment as well as to adjust the stock of human capital to the new labor demand structure the government conducted active labor market policies on a large scale. The focus of this paper is on the effects of the continuous vocational training and retraining part of these policies for workers of the former GDR participating in schemes that began after July 1990 and before April 1993. 1 The paper contributes to the ongoing discussion of the effectiveness of public-sector-sponsored training in East Germany by analyzing the participation decision before obtaining microeconometric evaluation results for several variables measuring the actual and prospective individual position in the labor markets. The findings suggest that in the short run publicsector-sponsored training has a negative impact, because it reduces job search efforts for the trainees during training compared to an equivalent spell of unemployment. Several months past the end of training no statistically significant effects are found. Hence, the results suggest that training was on average ineffective in improving participants' individual chances on the East German labor markets.
Since experimental data on these programs are not available, an econometric evaluation faces the typical problems of selection bias due to a correlation of individual program participation with the outcomes under investigation. Without assumptions, the effects of the programs cannot be identified. In this paper, I argue that using an informative panel data set -the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) -together with plausible 'exogeneity' assumptions derived from the specific structure of the German unification process, leads to the identification of the program effects. To be specific, the key point is that conditional on a rich set of observable factors including for example the individual employment histories on a monthly basis, participation in the programs is a random event (conditional independence assumption, CIA).
Of course there are many alternative ways to identify the effects of training, or more generally of 'treatments' (see for example the surveys by Angrist and Krueger, 1999, and Heckman, LaLonde and . Some of them are used for East Germany as well. For example the paper by Fitzenberger and Prey (1997, FP) , that is concerned with an evaluation of the effect of East German training on individual unemployment, models the joint distribution of labor market outcomes and participation using a panel probit model with a selection equation. The advantage of CIA compared to such model-based approaches is that it is conceptionally straightforward so that its validity can be more easily assessed than the validity of a mix of assumptions about functional forms, distributions of error terms, and exclusion restrictions.
The latter is usually difficult to justify by economic reasoning and often difficult to communicate to non-econometricians. In addition Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and LaLonde (1986) -among others -find that the results are highly sensitive to different (plausible) stochastic assumptions made about the selection process. 2 When identification is achieved by nonparametric assumptions like CIA, it appears to be 'natural' that estimation is also conducted nonparametrically. Matching methods (e.g. Rubin, 1979 , Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 have received renewed attention in the literature as 1 There was a considerable policy shift during 1993. This paper concentrates on the regime that was valid before April 1993. 2 Heckman and Hotz (1989) dispute some of the pessimistic claims by LaLonde (1986) . a nonparametric estimator useful for evaluation studies (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 1995, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998) . The idea of matching closely resembles the typical estimator used in the setting of ideal social experiments: the treatment effect is estimated by the difference between the mean of the outcome variable in the treatment group and the mean in the comparison group. The comparison group consists typically of individuals who applied for the program but who are randomly denied participation. Therefore, their only systematic difference compared to the participants is their participation status. Prototypical matching estimators mirror this approach by choosing a comparison group from all nonparticipants such that this group is -in the ideal case -identical to the treatment group with respect to the variables used in the particular formulation of the CIA.
Although there are many evaluation studies for US-training programs (e.g. LaLonde, 1995, Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins, 1997) , there are only very few econometric evaluations of training in East Germany. One of these studies is the already mentioned paper by FP.
3 Their data comes from the Labor Market Monitor covering the period from November 1990 to November 1992. It is a mail survey conducted every 4 to 6 months. Although the number of observations is higher than in the GSOEP, it lacks the variables needed for nonparametrically identifying the effects of training, hence FP use the already-mentioned modeling strategy. FP interpret their findings to imply that training is indeed effective in reducing the unemployment risk of participants, a result that is in contrast to the findings presented in this paper. However, the two studies are difficult to compare, because they do not only use different sets of data, different definitions of training, different identifying assumptions, and different estimators, but FP also require far more homogeneity of the effect of training across the population.
The second related study is Lechner (1999) . Based on GSOEP data up to 1994, in the application part Lechner (1999) investigates 'off-the-job' training. However, his application has several shortcomings. First, the definition of 'off-the-job' training includes many short training spells that are not subsidized at all by the labor office (like evening schools). Furthermore, many longer spells are missed because of the way the training variable is defined. 4 Second, only very short term effects can be estimated due to the data used. Therefore, these results
should not be used to discuss the effectiveness of public sector-sponsored training and retraining.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section outlines basic features of the East German labor markets after unification. It includes a brief discussion of the training part of the active labor market policy. Section 3 introduces the longitudinal data used in this study and presents several characteristics of the sample chosen. Issues related to the econometric methodology and the empirical implementation are discussed in the subsections of Section 4. The first subsection details the causality framework used and discusses the identification of average causal effects. The following two subsections identify factors influencing labor market outcomes as well as training participation and show that shocks, such as the occurrence of unemployment, play an important role for the participation probability. A matching approach is suggested that allows for these factors to be included in the choice of the comparison population. The final subsection defines the outcomes, gives details of the suggested estimation approach, and shows the results. Section 5 concludes.
East German labor markets in transition
The shock of German Unification resulted in a large drop of GDP in 1990. In the period 1991 to 1994 GDP grew by about 6-8% p.a. while average earnings per worker increased from about 48% of the West German level in 1991 to about 73% of that level. For the population of interest, the active labor force of the late GDR, full-time employment declines from 100% in mid 1990 to about 72% in early 1991 and than stabilizes at around 80%. 7 A very significant proportion of the early fall is absorbed into short-time work. As a result of the decline of short-time work after early 1991 as well as of the worsening labor market conditions, the unemployment rate increased to about 12 % in late 1993. 8 Finally, the number of people taking part in CTRT increased steadily after unification and reached its peak in early 1992 with about 4% of those full-time employed in 1990. It fell thereafter due to policy changes.
CTRT is subsidized by the labor office under provisions of the Work Support Act ("Arbeitsförderungsgesetz"). It forms the largest part of the continuous training and retraining taking place after unification. There are three broad types of supported training: (i) continuous training to increase skills within the current occupation, (ii) learning a new occupation (retraining), and (iii) subsidies to employers to provide on-the-job training for individuals facing difficult labor market conditions. Here, the focus is on continuous training and retraining, that account for more than 90% of all entries in these subsidized courses. Continuous training and retraining are typically classroom training (99%).
The conditions used by the labor office for deciding whether to individually support training are related to the employment history (the longer the unemployment spell, the 'better'), the general approval of the that kind of course by the labor office, and the prospect that training will lead to employment afterwards (ie. to terminate unemployment or to avoid the possibility of becoming unemployed soon). Until 1993 the last principle has been applied using a broad interpretation in East Germany, so that a general risk to become unemployed in the future was sufficient. This condition was not really restrictive in a rapidly contracting economy. In most cases the payments from the labor office cover the costs for the provision of the course as well as 65% to 73% of the previous net earnings ("Unterhaltsgeld", called t-benefits in the following). This is about 10% higher than unemployment benefits. The decision about payments is made by a job counselor of the local labor office.
9
After Spring 1993 the rules have been tightened to ensure that the now reduced budget is more precisely targeted to those being unemployed. Therefore, the current analysis is based on recipients of t-benefits (including short-time work with training) who began their training not later than March 1993. This group and the corresponding training is appreviated as CTRT.
8 Unemployment, short-time work, and CTRT numbers are lower than the official ones for the total population, because of the age restriction and because of different definitions of the relevant populations. Furthermore, CTRT includes only individuals receiving compensation for potential earnings losses. 9 Our own interviews with selected job counselors at the local level confirm the view that between 1990 and 1993 the supply of CTRT was not significantly rationed. The share of participants unemployed before CTRT increases due to the worsening situation of the labor markets as well as due to the tightening of the admission rules set by the labor office. The share of recipients of t-benefits is above 80% for 1992 and 1993.
< Table 2 about here >
The labor office is the most important source of finance for CTRT. Table 2 shows the expenditure of the labor office for CTRT from 1991 to 1993. In 1992 and 1993 more than 60% of the total expenditure of about DM 10 bn was allocated to t-benefits. Most of the remainder covers direct costs of CTRT, and a small proportion goes as direct support to the providers of the training.
Data
The sample for the empirical analysis is drawn from the German Socio Economic Panel hence an unbalanced panel is used for this period. The upper age limit is set to avoid the need to address early retirement issues. 12 Since the population of interest is the labor force of the GDR, selected individuals work full-time just before unification. Furthermore, the selfemployed in the former GDR (1990, 2% of non-CTRT sample), individuals working in the GDR (1990) in the industrial sectors energy and water (3%) or mining (3%), and persons certainly expecting in 1990 improvements in their career in the next two years (2%) are not observed taking part in CTRT, so they are deleted from the sample. Individuals reporting severe medical conditions are not considered either, because they received very specific training.
The calendars are used to define the training variable CTRT. Individuals participate in CTRT if they receive t-benefits or obtain continuous training during short-time work. As already explained training must begin after July 1990 but not later than March 1993. The mean (median, std.) of the duration of CTRT is about 12 (11, 7) months. 14% of the CTRT spells have a duration of no more than 3 months, 26% of no more than 6 months, 58% of no more than 12 months, and 90% of no more than 24 months. Comparing these spells with the durations of continuous training, retraining, and subsidies to employers to provide on-the-job training for individuals facing difficult labor market conditions spells as given by the labor office, it is found that a substantial fraction of short spells is missing from the sample. 13 However, by omitting very short spells that may be related to §41a Work Support Act the following empirical analysis is focused on the longer spells that absorb most of the resources and are a priori considered to be more effective. Figure 1 shows the share of CTRT participants that are unemployed a specific number of months before or after CTRT. There is a substantial increase in unemployment beginning about 10 months prior to CTRT resulting in an unemployment rate of about 54% in the month just prior to training (rate 12 months prior to CTRT: 22%). The respective rates for full-time employment are 23% (12 months: 58%), and 77% (12 months: 43%) for the combined rate of unemployment and short-time work. It is thus clear that CTRT participants are not a random sample from the population, as is of course intended by the labor office.
< Figure 1 about here > Considering the post-CTRT period, many CTRT participants find jobs fairly quickly. Whether they do this fast enough to make up for the time lost for search during CTRT will be seen below. The labor office publishes the share of unemployed six months after the end of CTRT.
They are within the ranges shown in Figure 1 . 14 Ashenfelter's (1978) dip in earnings prior to a training program appears only when real pre-and post CTRT earnings of trainees are compared to a randomly chosen group of nontrainees. It is however due to increasing unemployment before CTRT. noted correctly that when earnings dynamics 13 However, note that not only the comparison is not valid because of the inclusion of subsidies to employers to provide on-the-job training for individuals facing difficult labor market conditions in the official numbers, but also that there are issues related to the questionnaire (retrospective calendar): (1) participants may forget very short training spells; (2) respondents may not bother to tick boxes for a particular month in case of very short spells of a few days; (3) multiple spells are added (10%). 14 See Buttler and Emmerich (1994) , Blaschke and Nagel (1995) , IAB (1995), p. 134. are driven by unemployment dynamics, controlling for lagged earnings is not sufficient when evaluating the impact of CTRT.
Considering other socio-economic variables 15 , there is no large age difference, but there are far more women in CTRT than men. Regarding schooling degrees, professional degrees and job positions in 1990, a very similar pattern appears. Individuals who accumulated more human capital and who reached a higher job position in the former GDR are more likely to seek and obtain CTRT. Note that many of the trainees are highly educated. Therefore, it is obvious that the participants under investigation in this paper do not necessarily belong to the 'classical'
low-skill-low-ability group that is targeted by many government training programs in the US and other western European countries.
Econometric methodology and empirical implementation
Causality, potential outcomes, identification, and balancing scores
The empirical analysis attempts to answer questions like "What is the average gain for CTRT participants compared to the hypothetical state of nonparticipation?", generally known as the average treatment effect on the treated. The question refers to potential outcomes. The underlying notion of causality requires the researcher to determine whether participation or nonparticipation in CTRT effects the respective outcomes, such as employment status. This is different from asking whether there is an empirical association between CTRT and the outcome. 16 The previous section already showed that before-after comparisons are insufficient to control for the selectivity problem that is clearly visible in the data and obviously related to this question. In this section notation necessary to address this problem directly is introduced.
The framework serving as a guideline for the empirical analysis is the potential-outcome approach to causality suggested by Rubin (1974 The average treatment effect on the treated is defined in equation (1):
The short hand notation E(⋅|S=1) denotes the mean in the population of all units who participate in training, denoted by S=1. To draw inference only in subpopulations of S=1, defined by attributes in X, the respective expressions are changed in an obvious way. If there is random assignment as in a suitably-designed experiment, then the potential outcomes are independent from the assignment mechanism and E Y S
Thus the untreated could be used as the control group, because the expectation of their observable outcome would be equal to E Y S c ( | ) = 1 . However, as shown above, the assumption of random assignment is not satisfied in this study, because there are several variables influencing assignment as well as outcomes.
Using the law of iterated expectations to rewrite the crucial part of equation (1) as:
it becomes clear that assumptions leading to
1 could then be estimated by standard methods (note however that the outer expectation operator is with respect to the distribution of X in the population of participants). Rubin (1977) proposed such an assumption, called random assignment conditional on a covariate. As used here the assumption is that the assignment is independent of the potential non-treatment outcome conditional on the value of a covariate or attribute (conditional independence assumption, CIA). The following sections show that this restriction is reasonable in the context under investigation. The task will be to identify and observe all variables that could be correlated with assignment and potential nontreatment outcomes. This implies that there is no variable left out that influences nontreatment outcomes as well as assignment given a fixed value of the relevant attributes.
18 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if CIA is valid the estimation problem simplifies. Let P(x) = P(S=1|X=x) denote the nontrivial participation probability (0 < P(x) < 1) conditional and small letters denote the respective quantities in the sample. Sample units (n=1,...,N) are supposed to come from N independent draws in this population. 18 In the language of regression-type approaches such a variable leads to simultaneity bias. on a vector of characteristics x. P(x) is called the propensity score. Furthermore, let b(x) be a function of attributes such that P[S=1|b(x)] = P(x), or in the words of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , the balancing score b(x) is at least as 'fine' as the propensity score. They show that if the potential outcomes are independent of the assignment conditional on X, they are also independent of the assignment conditional on b(X), hence:
and
0 1 can be used for estimation. The advantage of this property is the reduction of dimension of the (nonparametric) estimation problem.
However, the probability of assignment -and consequently any dimension reducing balancing score -is unknown and has to be estimated. This estimation may also lead to a better understanding of the assignment process itself.
4.2
The balancing score
Variables potentially influencing the training decision and outcomes
Variables influencing the decision to participate in CTRT as well as future potential outcomes should be included in the conditioning set X. Considered outcomes are employment status, earnings, expected unemployment and expected changes in job positions in the next two years.
Suppose now that individuals are maximizing expected utility. To find candidate elements of X it is not necessary to develop a formal behavioral model, instead considering its broad building blocks, i.e. factors determining expected future earnings and leisure, is sufficient. In principle one would like to condition directly on expected earnings (utility) streams in both states, but since they are unobserved, they have to be decomposed into costs and expected re-turns of CTRT. 19 The participation decision has two dimensions: (i) the individual may push the labor office to allow him to participate in subsidized CTRT (getting this approval was easy until 1993), or (ii) the labor office may push unemployed or individuals on short-time work programs to participate in CTRT by threatening to reduce benefits. Therefore, both sides are considered in the following.
Standard human capital theory as well as signalling theory suggest that earnings with CTRT should be different than earnings without it, everything else being equal. The first focuses on increased individual productivity, whereas the second suggests that CTRT can act as a signalling device for an employer who has incomplete information on the worker's productivity.
Participation in CTRT might signal higher productivity (or reverse, if there is stigma associated with CTRT). In both cases the pay-back-period from the investment in training depends on age. The returns from the training may also differ with the previous stock of human capital and other socio-demographic characteristics. It is also important how the individual forms the expectation about the future. Here, information about the outcome of the expectation formation process is available on a yearly basis, namely the subjective expectations concerning the own labor market prospects.
The potential costs of CTRT for the individual can be divided in two broad groups: direct costs and indirect or opportunity costs. Direct costs are borne by the labor office that tends to subsidize individuals with low nontraining labor market prospects (as estimated by the labor office) and high CTRT prospects. Opportunity costs basically consist of lost earnings, and perhaps lost leisure. Hence, the actual labor market status as well as the entire labor market history, in particular with respect to spells of unemployment after 1990, can be important 19 For these considerations, it does not matter how the labor market really works, but how the individual (and / or the labor office) believes it to work at the time of the participation decision. There might be substantial differences between actual and expected outcomes because individuals are used to the rules of a former command type economy. Furthermore, rapid changes after unification make correct predictions difficult.
factors. 20 Costs of leisure may also differ across individuals according to tastes, as well as other socio-economic factors such as marital status or the perceived actual (present) utility of time spent in training.
The above analysis has identified age, expected labor market prospects, actual employment status, and other socio-economic characteristics as major factors that could potentially influence the training decision. Before going into more detail about the groups of variables used in the empirical analysis, two assumptions are stated that are important for the particular situation in East Germany after unification, because they help to make CIA a justifiable assumption.
The first assumption is that the complete switch from a centrally planned economy to a market economy in mid 1990, accompanied by a completely new incentive system, invalidates any long term plans that connect past employment behavior to CTRT participation. It was generally impossible for East German workers to predict the impact and timing of the system change. Even when it was partly correctly foreseen, it was generally impossible to adjust behavior adequately in the old system. The second assumption is related to the labor market in the rapidly contracting East German economy with continuously rising unemployment. It is assumed that no individual -having only slim chances of getting rehired once being unemployed -gives up employment voluntarily to get easier access to training funds.
These assumptions, that are certainly realistic, allow me to consider all pre-unification variables as well as all pre-training information on full-time employment, short-time work, and unemployment, etc., as attributes.
Variables that are used in the empirical analysis to approximate and describe the four broad It is assumed that controlling for factors that have already been decided by using the individual discount rate, such as schooling and professional education, are sufficient. Other issues concern possible restrictions of the maximization problem such as a limited supply of CTRT. Supply information is available, however it is aggregated either within states (6) or in four groups defined by the number of inhabitants of cities and villages. In conclusion, although some doubts could be raised, it seems safe to assume that these missing factors (conditional on all the other observable variables) play only a minor role.
Finally, papers analyzing training programs in the US point to the importance of transitory shocks before training, partly because of individual decisions, partly because of program administrators. For example, Card and Sullivan (1988) find a decline in employment probabilities before training. Here, the monthly employment status data take care of that problem.
The timing of the variables and the choice of the balancing score
The estimation of the propensity score is not straightforward, because there are potentially important variables -monthly pre-training employment status and yearly pre-training earnings for example -that are related to the distance in time (measured in months or years, respectively) to the beginning of CTRT. Since these dates differ across CTRT participants, such variables are not clearly defined for the comparison group. Lechner (1999) (Table 4) .
A second method is to estimate the distribution of start dates from the participants and then assign each comparison observation a date randomly drawn from this distribution (random). A third way to proceed is to use each month of every nonparticipant as a separate observation (with that particular start date; inflated). In that case the number with potential comparison observations is drastically increased. The last two approaches have the advantage that only a 'usual' balancing score of dimension one is needed. Lechner (1999) compares these approaches and finds that in the empirical application the first one appears to be superior particularly with respect to balancing the pre-treatment employment states. Therefore, the results presented are based on first approach. However, the latter two are computed as well to be used as a sensitivity check. Table 3 presents the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the partial propensity score, specified as a probit model, as well as the results of various specification tests. Although this estimation is only a by-product for the final evaluation a brief look at the results is nevertheless interesting. They suggest that women are more likely to participate in CTRT.
Estimation results for the partial propensity score
That is not surprising because women experience far more unemployment than men during the post-unification period. However, this partial correlation cannot be observed for highly qualified women. Older persons are c.p. less likely to be observed in CTRT. This is also not surprising since participants are on average three years younger than nonparticipants. Individuals who expect redundancies in the firm (in 1990) are more likely to be participants.
There appears to be also significant heterogeneity across different professions / occupations and industrial sectors. Finally, the negative coefficient of the variable that measures that the individual expects a decline in the professional career appears to be counter-intuitive, whereas the negative coefficient for individuals who believe that increasing one's own wealth is a very desirable behavior in a society may be due to a lower unemployment probability for these probably well-motivated individuals.
< Table 3 about here > Since the goal of the estimation is to obtain a consistent estimate of 0 β V , testing the validity of the preferred specification is important. First, all variables that are not contained in Table 3, but described in Table A .1, as well as different functional forms for the continuous variables and interaction terms between Gender and variables related to job position and education are subjected to score tests against omitted variables. None of them appears to be significantly missing at the 5% level. Most results are above the 10% level. 21 The results of the other specification tests do not provide any evidence against the chosen specification: The last two columns of Table 3 do not contradict the assumption of conditional homoscedasticity. Furthermore, the normality test as well as the information matrix tests do not reject. 
Nonparametric estimation of causal effects and matching
This section summarizes the nonparametric methods used to estimate the causal effects of CTRT as discussed by Lechner (1999) . The reader is referred to that paper for more details on the estimation methods. The suggested estimator of the training effect for the trainees can be written as follows:
Note that individual treatment effects remain unrestricted across participants. To ease notation assume that observations in the sample are ordered such that the first N t observations get 21 The standard errors and the score tests against heteroscedasticity and omitted variables are computed using the GMM (or PML) formula given in White (1982) . Five versions are computed: (i) based on the matrix of the outer product of the gradient (OPG) alone, (ii) on the empirical hessian alone, (iii) on the expected hessian alone, (iv) and on the product (hessian) -1 OPG (hessian) -1 , (v) respectively on (expected hessian) -1 OPG (expected hessian) -1 . Previous Monte Carlo studies (e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon, 1984) as well as theoretical papers (e.g. Dagenais and Dufour, 1991) suggest that tests based on the latter avoid some problems that can occur with other versions. Therefore, the results presented are computed using (v). 22 Conditional homoscedasticity and normality of the probit latent error terms are tested using conventional specification tests (Bera, Jarque, and Lee, 1984 , Davidson and MacKinnon, 1984 , and White, 1982 . The information matrix tests statistics (IMT) are computed using the second version suggested in Orme (1988) that appeared to have good small sample properties. Only main-diagonal indicators refers to the IMT using as test indicators only the main diagonal of the difference between OPG and expected hessian.
CTRT, and the remaining (N-N t ) observations do not. An obvious estimator of the first part is the sample mean of the output variable in the subsample of the trainees.
Given that CIA is valid,
needs to be a consistent estimator for
. One possible estimator that is in principle easy to compute and to implement in such a situation is the matching estimator proposed in the statistics literature (e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985) . 23 The idea of matching is to find for every treated observation a single comparison observation that is as close as possible in terms of the balancing score. When an identical comparison observation is found, the estimation of the average causal effect is unbiased. In cases of 'mismatches', it is often plausible to assume that local regressions on these differences will remove the bias (see Lechner, 1999) . Table 4 gives the exact matching protocol.
< Table 4 about here > This matching algorithm is close to the one proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and Rubin (1991) called "matching within calipers of the propensity score". They find that such a protocol produces the best results in terms of 'match quality' (reduction of bias). The difference here is that instead of using a fixed caliper-width for all observations, the widths vary individually with the precision of the estimate N n v βˆ. The more precisely N n v βˆ is estimated, the smaller is the width. The rationale behind this is that when using the partial propensity score for matching conditioning is on Since there appears to be sufficient overlap, the next question to be answered is whether matching balances the distribution of X in the CTRT and the matched comparison sample. Table 5 presents results to check balancing for the time-constant variables used in the probit estimation (time-varying variables are considered in the following section together with the evaluation results). Column (2) gives the marginal means of the unmatched comparison group, and columns (3) and (4) give the marginal means for the matched comparison group as well as for the CTRT participants. The last two columns present the p-value for the tests 23 Suitably refined nonparametric regressions could also be used. However, given the sample size and the high dimensional balancing score with many discrete components, nonparametric regressions will be subject to the typical curse of dimensionality. 24 Note that this matching method does not appear to fulfill any optimality condition: Match quality could be increased (i.e. the bias reduced) by using the same comparison observations more than once (i.e. increase the variance). But on the other hand more than one comparison observation could be assigned to any treated (reducing the variance, increasing the bias). Optimal matching depends on the distribution of X (e.g. Gu and Rosenbaum, 1992) . With the high dimension and the mixture of discrete and continuous elements in X, it is not sensible to estimate its distribution with the current sample. The selected algorithm is a compromise that is intuitively plausible and easy to implement. 25 The respective plot is contained in a previous version of the paper that can be downloaded from my web page (www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner).
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) . The 'two-sample' sample statistic (col. (5)) tests whether the two samples come from distributions with the same mean, whereas the 'paired' statistics check whether there are systematic differences of the means within the matched pairs. The final rows in that table present the respective joint tests.
< Table 5 about here > Table 5 shows that matching removes almost all differences for the variables that are significant in the estimation. When there are significant differences, it is with respect to variables that are insignificant in the probit. 26 Indeed, in the next section it is shown that over the whole pre-CTRT period CTRT observations and comparison observations do not differ significantly (with one exception to be discussed later). Nevertheless, it appears to be clear from the various evidence that the problem for the matching algorithms is to find enough well-educated persons with high unemployment probabilities. In conclusion, the matching algorithm provides an acceptable match, that is however not perfect. Therefore, the econometric correction mechanism described in Lechner (1999) could be useful to improve the estimates.
In the first part of their paper Card and Sullivan (1988) used a similar approach: They match treated and comparison observations regarding their pre-training employment history. They are in a worse position, because these variables are subject to considerable measurement error in their data. Besides, they ignore the kind of variables that enter the partial propensity score in this analysis. Therefore, it is not surprising that they find this kind of conditioning insufficient to yield unbiased estimates and switch to a model-based approach.
Evaluation
To describe the estimator resulting from the matching algorithm outlined above, define the differences in matched pairs in the sample as and in the sample matched to the CTRT-sample, respectively. 27 As mentioned in the previous section, when a perfect match is achieved, implying that ∆b x n ( ) = 0 , n N t = 1,..., , these estimates are consistent (cf. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . When the sample is large enough the normal distribution can be used to perform tests and compute confidence intervals.
Following the objective of the program the focus is on outcome variables measuring unemployment for particular months after the completion of CTRT. Since CTRT may end at different points in calendar time for different individuals this gives us an unbalanced panel (or non-rectangular sample), i.e. the number of observations is decreasing the longer the time span after the end of CTRT. 28 In addition to the instantaneous effect for a particular period, the accumulated effect of CTRT over that period is also estimated (as the sum of the respective single period effects for those individuals observed over the whole period under consideration; the variance estimates takes the correlation of the single period effects into account). 27 The variance estimate exploits the fact that the algorithm only chooses an observation once. 28 There is also some panel attrition contributing to this effect.
The results are given in Figure 2 and Table 6 . Figure 2 shows the differences of unemployment rates between the CTRT group and the comparison group. The mean effect (solid line; + for the mismatch-corrected estimate) and its 95% pointwise confidence interval based on the normal approximation (dashed line; ∇, ∆ for the mismatch corrected estimates) up to 24 months before CTRT and up to about 40 months after CTRT are displayed. Since the number of observations decreases the longer the distance to the incidence of CTRT is (see Table 6 ), the variance increases over post-CTRT time. This is reflected in the widening of the confidence intervals. However, the accuracy of the estimated intervals itself may deteriorate, because the normal distribution may be not a good approximation of the sample distribution of the mean anymore. Additionally, a mismatch correction may be impossible or very imprecise, because there may be too few observations to identify and estimate the parameters of the ordered probit model. Hence, on the very right hand side of Figure 2 the results have to be interpreted with care (the collapse of the intervals on the very right should be ignored because it is based on very few observations that happen not to vary at all).
< Figure 2 about here > The parts of Figure 2 to the left to the zero vertical mark (prior to CTRT) allows a judgement about the quality of the matches concerning that particular variable. 29 Although the number of unemployed persons is generally higher in the CTRT sample, it is only in the month just prior to CTRT that the difference is just significant (t-value: 1.95)
< Table 6 about here > Figure 2 also shows that the immediate effect of CTRT is additional unemployment in the months following the end of CTRT. After some months these negative effects disappear.
Indeed Table 6 , that contains also the effects of CTRT with respect to full-time employment,
shows that the total effect for unemployment cannot be distinguished from zero after 24 months (12 months for full-time employment). At first sight this seems surprising, because Figure 1 shows that the unemployment rate of CTRT participants is indeed falling rapidly during the first 12 months after CTRT. However, there seems to be a simple explanation for this effect. Recall that more than 50% of CTRT participants are unemployed before CTRT.
For an unemployed person the immediate effect of (full-time) CTRT is that during CTRT his or her search efforts will be reduced (mean duration is 12 months!) compared to the comparison nonparticipants. The results suggest that if there is a positive effect of CTRT it is not large enough to compensate for this initial negative outcome, and to be detected by the estimator (note that the confidence bands are wide enough to make it difficult to exclude the possibility of medium sized positive effects after about one year as well as of negative effects of CTRT).
These general findings are confirmed by considering as outcome variables the receipt of unemployment benefits, short-time work and unemployment together, or full-time employment.
Results from a sample of individuals who are either unemployed or on short-time work before CTRT sharpen these conclusions.
When earnings are considered as an outcome variable, the same conclusions are obtained: a very good match prior to training and no significant effect after training. 30 Other results are computed for different outcome variables that measure status or subjective prospects on the labor markets, such as job position, expectations about a possible job loss in the next two years, and whether one is very worried about keeping the current job. Additionally, there is information on whether individuals expect an improvement or a worsening of the current career position. With one exception there are no significant effects for all these variables. The 29 Testing whether these lines deviate significantly from zero is similar to tests suggested by Rosenbaum (1984) to use unaffected outcomes (in his terminology) or to try to invalidate CIA. They are called pre-program tests by Heckman and Hotz (1989) and others. 30 These results are also contained in the already-mentioned previous version of the paper available at www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner. exception is the variable measuring subjective career perspectives in the next two years. Although the effect of CTRT is positive, it is only for the first year after CTRT (mildly) significant.
When training programs are very large, the estimates presented above could be contaminated by so-called displacement effects or large program effect. This means that observations in the comparison group are affected by the program because market interaction might lead to more competition for them, thus depressing their earnings and reducing their employment probabilities. Although there might also be an off-setting effect during the time when participants are in CTRT and thus removed from the market, generally the former effect is expected to dominate at least in the longer term. It would lead to an estimate of the effects of CTRT that is 'too positive'. However, since the effects of CTRT are estimated to be close to zero in this paper, such a potential bias is not a problem with respect to the conclusion that CTRT appears to be ineffective in lowering the risk of unemployment and increasing earnings (it might even strengthen that conclusion).
Sensitivity
In addition to the already-mentioned issues, the sensitivity of the results are checked in several other directions.
First, the perspective of time is changed: instead of considering a period after the end of CTRT, pre-and post CTRT outcomes are compared and averaged for the same month / year in calendar time. This does not lead to different conclusions.
To check whether the average treatment effects differ in specific subgroups of participants, the sample is split according to gender, job position, occupational degree, age, and pre-training employment status. Furthermore different subsamples defined by characteristics of CTRT (start dates, end dates, duration, multiple spells of CTRT) are considered. No significant differences appear.
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To check whether the co-called contamination bias (e.g. Heckman and Robb, 1986) , meaning that the comparison group gets some other sort of training as a substitute for CTRT, might be a problem, new comparison and CTRT samples (about 75% of all participants) are selected.
Observations in these samples either get no continuous training at all, or obtain only CTRT.
Again, no significant differences appear.
Another concern might be the use of a nonrectangular sample due to different end dates and panel attrition. Therefore, a subsample of participants that are observed for at least 24 months after the end of CTRT is selected. The results for this subsample mirror very closely the results presented in the previous section.
The already-mentioned alternative ways to handle the issue of time-varying start dates (random, inflated) could be an issue. With respect to match quality, random assigns significantly too few unemployment persons into the matched comparison group. Inflated does not have this problem and produces a fairly balanced comparison sample (due to the increased number of comparison observations). The results are similar to those reported in the previous section.
The only difference for both approaches is that the effect on the already-mentioned variable measuring expected improvements in the job position in the next two years is positive (as before) and now highly significant for the first year after CTRT. For inflated it is positive and significant for the second year after CTRT as well.
Finally, for the yearly variables all computations are performed using the appropriate panel weights. However, since there are only minor differences among weighted and unweighted estimates, the former are not computed for the monthly data.
31 However, the power of these tests could be rather small because of the smaller samples.
In conclusion the sensitivity analysis shows a remarkable stability of the results.
Conclusion
The general findings of the paper suggest that there are no positive earnings and employment effects of public-sector-sponsored continuous vocational training and retraining (CTRT) in East Germany at least in the short-run. Regarding the risk of unemployment there are negative effects of CTRT directly after training ends. However, these negative effects fade out over the first year after training.
It is an open question whether the lack of a positive effects is due to a bad signal participants send to prospective employers, or whether it is due to a lack of quality in a narrower sense. Nevertheless, the results in this paper provide no justification of the large expenditure for CTRT until 1993. The results are compatible with the claim that CTRT was very much a waste of resources, providing quantity without sufficient quality (or a sufficiently positive signal). The quality problem has been realized by the labor office, that subsequently tried to improve quality and changed the selection process to include a higher share of individuals previously unemployed in CTRT. It should be noted that the lack of measurable success of the programs appears despite the fact that participants are in general well educated and had fairly high job positions in the GDR. Therefore, it is not the typical low-skill-low-ability group that is the target of many government programs in the US and western Europe.
The overall negative picture may be an exaggeration of the real situation for several reasons:
Firstly, money spent for CTRT in the first two to three years may be seen as investments in the East German training infrastructure, that had to be build from scratch. In this sense future CTRT might still yield some returns on these early investments. Secondly, the massive use of CTRT achieved a significant reduction of the official unemployment rate. This was politically desired, and hence it might be seen as an achievement per se, although there might have been cheaper ways to achieve this goal.
Although the data and the suggested nonparametric estimation strategy appeared to be well suited for the problem at hand, the small sample remains a problem. It is mainly reflected in comparatively large standard errors. Therefore, future research should investigate these effects with different data sources, ideally ones that are larger but not less informative than the GSOEP. Additionally, one might investigate jointly the effects of different types of training, such as on-the-job training versus off-the-job training, or publicly-funded versus privatelyfunded training. Likewise, it will be an issue whether the quality of the publicly-funded training did really improve after 1992, as claimed by official sources. 
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